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Abstract. The recent introduction of networked medical devices has posed 
many benefits for both the healthcare industry and improved patient care.  
However, because of the complexity of these devices, in particular the advanced 
communication ability of these devices, security is becoming an increasing 
concern. This paper presents work to develop a framework to assure the 
security of medical devices being incorporated into an IT network. It begins by 
looking at the development processes and the assurance of these through the use 
of a Process Assessment Model with a major focus on the security risk 
management processes. With the inclusion of a set of specific security controls, 
both the Healthcare Delivery Organisations and the Medical Device 
Manufacturers work together to establish fundamental security requirements. 
The Medical Device Manufacturer reports the achieved security assurance level 
of their device through the development of a security assurance case. The 
purpose of this approach is to increase awareness of security vulnerabilities, 
risks and controls among Medical Device Manufacturers and Healthcare 
Delivery Organisations with the aim of increasing the overall security capability 
of medical devices. 
Keywords: Process Assessment Model, Security Assurance, and Security 
Assurance Cases, Networked Medical Devices 
1   Introduction 
In terms of medical devices, design innovations over the last number of years have led 
to many outstanding benefits for patient care and healthcare providers. Such 
innovations include the increased use of software that has allowed Medical Device 
Manufacturers (MDMs) to add sophisticated functionality to devices such as insulin 
pumps that automatically detect dangerous glucose levels and administer the required 
insulin dosage to a diabetic patient. In the last few years we see an increase of 
interoperable and networked medical devices. Such medical devices have 
functionality to communicate via healthcare IT networks, wirelessly, across the 
Internet and from device to device. With this rise in the use and availability of 
networked medical devices, patients can now receive around-the-clock care even in 
the comfort of their own home outside the healthcare environment. This also benefits 
Healthcare Delivery Organizations (HDOs) greatly as the resource demand to 
administer this care is significantly reduced. HDOs utilize a wide range of networked 
devices from hard-wired monitoring devices such as diagnostic equipment (CT 
scanners) to implanted medical devices such as defibrillators. Clearly the benefits of 
networking these devices are significant but in using such technology, a new set of 
risks arise which are associated with their use. These are security risks, threats and 
vulnerabilities. In a report issued by the Department of Homeland Security [1], typical 
threats associated with each type of device (implantable, external and portable 
medical devices) are highlighted. As this technology is relatively new, the fear among 
the medical device industry is that the security for these devices is insufficient and has 
not been thoroughly addressed in terms of research and design. What is probably most 
concerning is that malicious attackers have not yet fully exploited these devices but 
do have potential to do so. This became evident through a number of controlled 
hacking demonstrations where security researchers proved the vulnerability of 
medical devices.  One such incident was at the 2011 Black Hat Security Conference 
in Las Vegas where, a diabetic security researcher hacked his own insulin pump 
during his presentation. This raised a lot of concern among the medical device domain 
and led to the interjection of the US government, which prompted the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) inquiry into the FDA’s assessment of 
medical devices in terms of security. The outcome of this was a report published in 
August 2012 [2] detailing the lack of consideration for both intentional and non-
intentional security vulnerabilities during the FDA’s PMA and 510k approval 
processes. 
This paper outlines work being carried out to address security issues for medical 
devices to be incorporated into an IT network. Subsection 1.1 introduces our approach 
to address the problem background. Following on from this the paper divides the 
framework looking at process assurance and product assurance. Section two describes 
process assurance and discusses key standards. Section three details how the final 
product assurance in terms of security is addressed.  Finally section four concludes 
the paper detailing next steps and the expected impact this work will have to the 
Figure 1 - Approach Overview 
medical device industry including the HDOs, MDMs and also in terms of regulatory 
compliance assessment. 
1.1   Overview 
This work aims to address security in networked medical devices and build awareness 
of the types of security vulnerabilities and threats that can negatively impact the 
safety of patients. A key objective is to strengthen the relationship between MDMs 
and HDOs and also increase the HDO IT administrations’ awareness of the security 
capability of the medical devices incorporated into their IT network. 
This is achieved through the development and use of a Process Reference Model 
(PRM), a Process Assessment Model (PAM) and a Process Measurement Framework 
in compliance with IEC/ISO 15504-2 [3] for the assurance of MDMs development 
processes and establishment of a process capability level. In addition to this, this work 
will also develop a separate framework to establish security assurance levels of the 
final product in relation to a series of security controls. This will involve the use of a 
tool for the risk management process which also incorporates Security Assurance 
Case development.  This will assist HDOs to better understand the suitability of the 
medical device for installation into their IT network. It will also impact MDMs in 
their design decisions during development of the medical devices. Figure 1 shows a 
high-level overview of the research objectives and framework, which is discussed in 
detail in the following two sections. 
2   Security Process Assurance 
2.1   The Process Assessment Model in Compliance with ISO/IEC 15504 
As previously mentioned, ISO/IEC 15504 will be utilized to establish the 
development process capability level. Compliance with IEC/ISO 15504 results in the 
following outputs; a Process Reference Model (PRM), a Process Assessment Model 
(PAM) and a process capability level.   
For the purpose of this research, the most suitable Process Reference Model (PRM) 
is defined in ISO/IEC 15288 – Systems Engineering – System Life Cycle Processes 
[4] will form the foundation for the PAM.  ISO/IEC 15288 provides a process 
framework that covers the entire life cycle of systems from cradle to grave.  A system 
is defined in this standard as having one of more of the following: 
 Software, hardware, humans, processes (e.g. review processes), procedures 
(e.g. operator instructions), facilities and natural occurring entities (e.g. 
water, organisms, minerals). 
As ISO/IEC 15504-6 [5] uses ISO/IEC 15288 as the external PRM, this has been 
selected as a suitable foundation for the PAM.  ISO/IEC 15504-6 details an exemplar 
PAM that also includes the process attributes that are compliant with ISO/IEC 15504-
2. The PAM contains two dimensions; the Process Dimension and the Capability 
Dimension. The Process Dimension utilizes the processes as defined in ISO/IEC 
15288 and describes these in terms of their ‘Process’ and ‘Outcome’ dividing these 
into four groups.  These are Agreement, Enterprise, Project and Technical processes.  
The PAM expands the PRM with the use of Performance Indicators called Base 
Practices (BP) and Work Products (WP). Base Practices are the basic required 
activities that specifically address the process purpose. They describe ‘what’ should 
be done in order to address the process but do not detail ‘how’ it should be done.  
Work Product performance indicators are the result of performing the process and are 
used to review the effectiveness of each process. Combined evidence of Work 
Practice characteristics and the performance of Base Practices provide the objective 
evidence of achievement of the ‘Process Purpose’. 
The Capability Dimension, as set out in ISO/IEC 15504-2, utilizes six Capability 
Levels from Level 0, ‘Non Performing’ to Level 5, ‘Optimizing’. As defined in 
ISO/IEC 15504-2, the measurement framework is based upon a set of Process 
Attributes of which there are a total of nine associated with Levels 1 through to 5. 
These Process Attributes represent measurable characteristics required to manage and 
improve each process. The extent of achievement of each attribute is defined on a 
rating scale indicated in ISO/IEC 15504-2 and represented in Table 1. In ISO/IEC 
15504-6, these Process Attributes include Generic Work Practices, which belong to a 
set of Process Capability Indicators.  These indicators are the means of achievement 
of the capability addressed by each of the Process Attributes within each of the 
associated Capability Levels.  
The PAM is being developed in compliance with ISO/IEC 15504-2. ISO/IEC 
15504-6 will form the foundation of the model as it contains the processes necessary 
for compliance with ISO/IEC 15288. To further extend the PRM and the PAM, 
additional processes from ISO/IEC 15026-4 [6] will also be included in order to 
address security assurance. ISO/IEC 15026-4 is mainly utilized where additional 
assurance for a critical property, such as dependability, safety or security, is required 
for a system or software. The standard is used as an add-on to an already existing life 
cycle process standard such as ISO/IEC 15288.   
Table 1 - ISO/IEC 15504-2, Rating Scale 
Indicator Meaning Value 
N Not Achieved 0 to 15% achievement 
P Partially Achieved >15% to 50% achievement 
L Largely Achieved >50% to 85% achievement 
F Fully Achieved >85% to 100% achievement 
 
2.1   Building Additional Assurance into the PAM 
Due to the criticality of medical device security, additional assurance during the 
development life cycle is achieved through the inclusion of ISO/IEC 15026-4 – 
Systems and Software Engineering – Systems and Software assurance – Assurance in 
the life cycle - processes in the PRM. 
ISO/IEC 15026-4 is a relatively new standard providing a process framework 
(Systems Assurance Process View) for software or systems that require an assurance 
claim for particular systems aspects that require additional attention, otherwise known 
as critical properties. Critical properties are usually in areas where substantial risk is 
involved such as safety, dependability, reliability and in this case, security. The 
standard presents a set of add-on processes, activities and tasks with guidance and 
recommendations. These processes, activities and tasks are intended to build upon the 
Agreement, Project and Technical processes as set out in ISO/IEC 15288.  Therefore 
conformance to this standard is achieved through the demonstration of these 
additional processes as well as conformance with the Agreement, Project and 
Technical processes of ISO/IEC 15288. For this reason, demonstration of additional 
assurance specifically addressing security, through the use of this standard relates and 
integrates well with the Process Assessment Model as set out in ISO/IEC 15026-4.  
Table 2 presents the relationship between ISO/IEC 15288, ISO/IEC 15504-6 and 
ISO/IEC 15026-4. The black cells represent the family of processes addressed in 
ISO/IEC 15288. The grey shaded cells indicate processes that include additional 
recommendations for the assurance of the final product in terms of security being the 
critical property. With the successful implementation of ISO/IEC 15026-4, the 
following expected outcomes are: 
a) A subset of requirements for the achievement of critical properties is defined. 
b) Assurance claims, their justification, and the body of information showing the 
achievement of the assurance claims for the critical properties are established 
as an element of the system.1 
c) A strategy for achieving these assurance claims and showing their 
achievement is defined. 
d) The extent of achievement of the assurance claims is communicated to affected 
stakeholder. 
                                                          
1 Assurance claims, the framework and reasoning for use is detailed in section 3.2 of this paper. 
 3   Security Product Assurance 
To specifically address security as the system critical property, the PAM again, will 
be further extended. In this section we focus on the Security Risk Management 
Processes and introduce new considerations and tools to be utilized during security 
risk management activities (Process Reference PRJ.5 from ISO/IEC 15504-6).  
Section 3.1 discusses security standards, security controls and the development of a 
validated expert reviewed set of security controls to be adopted by this framework in 
assuring the security of medical devices. Section 3.2 then discusses security assurance 
cases, the benefits of developing security assurance cases and how security assurance 
cases are employed in this framework. Finally, section 3.3 introduces a schema for 
generating a security assurance value for the final product and discusses the benefits 
of generating such a value to the medical device industry. 
Table 2 – Standards Process Relationship 
Agreement Processes 
ISO/IEC 15288  ISO/IEC 15504-6 ISO/IEC 15026-4 
Acquisition Processes AGR.1 7.1 
Supply Processes AGR.2  
Enterprise Resources 
ISO/IEC 15288 ISO/IEC 15504-6 ISO/IEC 15026-4 
Enterprise Environment Management Process ENT.1  
Investment Management Process ENT.2  
System Life Cycle Processes Management 
Process 
ENT.3  
Resource Management Process ENT.4  
Quality Management Process ENT.5  
Project Resources 
ISO/IEC 15288 ISO/IEC 15504-6 ISO/IEC 15026-4 
Project Planning Process PRJ.1 7.3 
Project Assessment Process PRJ.2  
Project Control Process PRJ.3  
Decision-Making Process PRJ.4 7.4 
Risk Management Process PRJ.5 7.5 
Configuration Management Process PRJ.6 7.6 
Information Management Process PRJ.7 7.7 
Technical Resources 
ISO/IEC 15288 ISO/IEC 15504-6 ISO/IEC 15026-4 
Stakeholder Requirements Definition Process TEC.1 7.8 
Requirements Analysis Process TEC.2 7.9 
Architectural Design Process TEC.3  
Implementation Process TEC.4  
Integration Process TEC.5  
Verification Process TEC.6 7.10 
Transition Process TEC.7  
Validation Process TEC.8  
Operation Process TEC.9 7.11 
Maintenance Process TEC.10 7.12 
 
 
3.1   Security Controls for the Risk Management Process  
IEC/TR 80001-2-2 - Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating 
medical devices - Guidance for the communication of medical device security needs, 
risks and controls [7] is a technical report which sets out to promote the 
communication of security controls, needs and risks of medical devices to be 
incorporated into IT networks between MDMs, IT vendors and HDOs. This technical 
report presents 20 security capabilities that both the HDOs use to communicate their 
security requirements prior to acquisition of a medical device and the MDMs use to 
communicate the final status of the product in relation to those security capabilities. 
This technical report will form the foundation for the security risk management 
process in that; the 20 capabilities here will be included in the risk management 
process. Reasons for exclusion of capabilities or those deemed unnecessary for a 
particular product must still be justified and documented. For example, in ISO/IEC 
15504-6, Process PRJ.5 - Risk Management Process, the process purpose is to 
identify and assess threats and monitor the risks throughout the life cycle.  The PAM 
further extends this with the inclusion of Base Practice ‘PRJ.4.BP.2: Identify Risks’ as 
a performance indicator. These processes are further adapted to address security risks 
in addition to project or product risks. The outcome of this work will be the inclusion 
of a list of security risks here, which a MDM must address during the security risk 
management process in order to ensure the desired security capability of the medical 
device is achieved. For each of these security risks, evidence must be provided to 
prove that the Base Practices were carried out with the full list of controls considered.  
For example, consider the security capability from IEC/TR 80001-2-2, Automatic Log 
Off, the MDM must consider this control and establish whether there is a risk 
associated with the elimination of the control. If no risk is associated, evidence will be 
provided and documented to prove this. If, however, a risk is identified due to the 
elimination of this control then the MDM must follow through the rest of the Base 
Practices for the Security Risk Management Process.  These are: 
PRJ.4.BP.3 Determine the Risk Occurrence Probability 
PRJ.4.BP.4 Evaluate the Risk Consequence 
PRJ.4.BP.5 Prioritize Risks 
PRJ.4.BP.6 Select Risk Treatment Strategies 
Base Practice PRJ.4.BP.6, Select Risk Treatment Strategy will be the security control, 
Automatic Log Off functionality. 
One of the first steps in this work was to determine the security controls that 
should be included in the security risk management process. This was done by 
carrying out a cross-standard review of all security controls to establish if there are 
gaps in the 20 capabilities of IEC 80001-2-2. The standards reviewed were ISO/IEC 
27001 [8], ISO/IEC 27799 [9], ISO 15408 [10], IEC 62443-3-3 [11] and NIST SP 
800-53 [12]. Each of these standards and guidance documents similarly highlight 
security classes and controls and, as a result many controls are presented in numerous 
standards. For this reason a security control matrix has been developed to map the 
controls from each standard and identify those similar to compile a complete set of 
controls addressed in all standards. Those controls that relate will be rated in terms of 
their similarity. Following on from this, a gap analysis will be conducted in order to 
identify further capabilities that should be included in IEC 80001-2-2. This will be 
achieved through the use of expert opinion. The expert users from industry plus the 
FDA will validate the controls. The validated security controls will form the 
foundation for the security risk management process. A Technical Report will be 
published in the coming months detailing this security matrix gap analysis with the 
anticipation that IEC/TR 80001-2-2 will be revised based on this. The architecture of 
this framework will then be somewhat consolidated to use only the capabilities 
outlined in IEC 80001-2-2 as opposed to a multitude of standards. This will provide 
benefits for MDMs and HDOs in that they only need update their security risk 
management processes in line with one source standard. 
3.2 Security Assurance Cases – Building-In Assurance 
In support of IEC/TR 80001-2-2, development of security assurance cases are a key 
element of this framework for the interchange of security assurance information 
between MDMs and HDOs. Traditionally, assurance cases in the medical device 
domain have been used to address safety concerns. Since April 2010, Infusion Pump 
manufacturers have been operating under the Infusion Pump Improvement Initiative 
where a draft guidance document [13] recommends the use of assurance cases for use 
during the approval process for new Infusion Pumps entering the market. The FDA 
recommends the use of assurance cases to communicate information about the safety 
of the device and how risks have been identified and mitigated [13].   
"In making this demonstration of substantial equivalence for your infusion pump, 
FDA recommends that you submit your information through a framework known as 
an assurance case or assurance case report." 
Assurance cases can be defined as “a reasoned and compelling argument, supported 
by a body of evidence, that a system, service or organization will operate as intended 
for a defined application in a defined environment [14]. They are most often used 
when the requirement to demonstrate that a system or software exhibit a critical 
property that is usually risk-related and requires additional assurance such as safety, 
dependability or, in this case, security. Assurance cases are quite often compared to 
legal cases where a claim is supported by a comprehensive argument showing how 
evidence supports the overall claim. Therefore, the three main components of an 
assurance case as defined in the GSN standard [14] are: 
 
1.  Claim A proposition being asserted by the author that is a true or false 
statement i.e. the system is adequately secure. 
2.  Argument A body of information presented with the intention to establish one 
or more claims through the presentation of related supporting 
claims, evidence and contextual information. 
3.  Evidence Information or objective artifacts being offered in support of one or 
more claims. Evidence may include component test results, policies, 
code reviews, training records, good processes among others. 
 
Looking at Figure 2 (a simplistic layout of an assurance case) we can now say: 
If Evidence A then Claim 2 
If Evidence B then Claim 4 
If Evidence C then Claim 5 
If Claim 4 & Claim 5 then Claim 3 
If Claim 2 & Claim 3 then Claim 1 
For this work, the proposed method for development of the security assurance 
cases focuses fundamentally on the security capability requirements as agreed 
between the HDO and the MDM (section 3.3). During the security risk management 
process, the manufacturer will utilize a software tool for the development of the risk 
analysis and the FMEA. This tool has been specifically developed for manufacturers 
of safety critical products to assist in the development, management and maintenance 
of the risk management processes. This particular tool works quite well with the 
artifacts of this framework as it automatically generates an assurance case through the 
progression of the FMEA process. The security assurance case arguments and 
evidence will relate directly to the achievement of each of the security capabilities and 
so for example, if ‘Authentication’ is defined as a requirement by the HDO then the 
evidence could detail login and password controls as implemented by the MDM. The 
assurance case will clearly identify the relationships between the claims to assist 
manufacturers in developing a meaningful and thorough argument resulting in 
adequate evidence to support a higher level claim stating that the system is 
acceptably. 
To further ensure the strength of the argument, guidelines will also be published to 
assist the MDMs in establishing the security assurance level of their product based on 
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Figure 2 – Assurance Claim Structure 
3.3 – Establishment of the Final Product Security Assurance Level 
Communication of a Security Assurance Level (SAL) to HDOs will provide a simple 
and meaningful method for establishing suitability of the device for the users need 
and its environment. To do this, IEC 62443-3-3 is being used as a guide for 
establishing the system security assurance level by the MDMs. As previously stated, 
the HDO will determine the appropriate security capabilities from within IEC/TR 
80001-2-2 along with any other validated capabilities from other standards should 
they not be included here. The communication of the security capabilities from the 
HDO is used as a means to open discussion only between the HDO and the MDM. 
The purpose of this is to build awareness of security risks, threats and vulnerabilities 
among HDOs. MDMs carry out the security risk management processes thereafter. 
With regards the different types of SAL, the critical value is the achieved SAL (SAL-
A) since this is most valuable to the HDO and the FDA when establishing the security 
capability of the product.  Post product development, the MDM will communicate the 
SAL-A to the HDO which will be based on the agreed target SAL (SAL-T) level (0-4) 
as determined by both the MDM and HDO at the start of the acquisition process. The 
SAL vector detailing the assurance level and security capabilities is presented here:  
SAL-A = (FR, domain) = {AC  UC  DI  DC  RDF  TRE  RA} 
SAL-A = (FR, domain) = {3  3  3  3  2  1  0} 
Table 3 - IEC 62443-3-3 Foundational Requirements 
Foundational Requirement Code 
Identification and Authentication Control IAC 
Use Control UC 
Data Integrity DI 
Data Confidentiality DC 
Restricted Data Flow RDF 
Timely Response to Events TRE 
Resource Availability RA 
For each of the parameters within the vector (refer to table 3 for Foundational 
Requirements (FR) descriptions), a value of zero to four will be used to represent the 
SAL level for that particular requirement. A SAL Level 4 represents medical devices 
that have undergone most rigour in terms of security assurance. Following on from 
this, the MDM will then verify the selected SAL level through the use of the SAL 
Mapping Matrix as shown in Annex B of IEC 62443-3-3, which will also be included 
in the PRM. This information, prior to a HDO installing the medical device into their 
IT network will be communicated to them by the MDM. 
4   Conclusion 
This paper presents a two-step framework for the assurance of networked and 
interoperable medical devices in terms of security. The framework combines an array 
of standards, guidance documents and processes to create a step by step process for 
MDMs to use during development. The objective is to decrease the risk of potential 
security vulnerabilities associated with the use of networked medical devices. As one 
component of the framework is a process assessment model with an associated 
measurement framework it provides great benefits to the FDA and for external 
assessors in establishing process quality. The framework presented in this paper is 
twofold, addressing process assurance and also final product security assurance 
separately.   
The output for the process assurance component is: 
1. The development of an extended PAM and PRM. 
2. A validated set of applicable and meaningful security controls to be adopted 
and included in the Risk Management process of the PAM. 
3. The publication of a technical report detailing the security controls required 
for consideration in using this framework. 
The expected output for the product assurance component is: 
1. A technical report detailing the strategy and framework for carrying out the 
Risk Management process with the use of a software tool. 
2. A framework for addressing the security controls and building a security 
assurance case around these controls. 
3. A framework for the assignment of achieved security assurance levels for a 
networked medical device.  
It is expected that this framework will be trialled with MDMs and HDOs in both 
Europe and the US. In applying this, MDMs will have three major outputs upon 
application.  
These outputs are: 
1. A process maturity level for the development of the product. 
2. An achieved security assurance level (SAL-A) for the final product. 
3. A security assurance case detailing in depth, the arguments and evidence 
supporting the security claim for the medical device.  This assurance case 
will be used to communicate the security assurance of the product to the 
HDO where the medical device will be installed. 
Currently no such framework exists to address both the development processes and 
the security product capabilities of networked medical devices. This is the primary 
focus of this work, hence, it is envisaged that the output of this work will positively 
impact the medical device domain by building awareness of security vulnerabilities, 
threats and related risks for HDOs and MDMs [15].  
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